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YOU MIGHT JUST HAVE TO WAIT: 
INTERPRETING STATE ACTION IMMUNITY 
AND THE ABILITY TO APPEAL FOLLOWING 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN 
SOLARCITY CORP. v. SALT RIVER PROJECT 
Abstract: On June 12, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held in SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement 
and Power District that the doctrine of state action immunity confers immunity 
from liability, and therefore a court ruling granting or denying state action im-
munity may not be immediately appealed. In concluding this, the Ninth Circuit 
joined the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in opposition to the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, which held that state action immunity confers immunity from suit and may 
be immediately appealed. The interpretation of state action immunity thus direct-
ly affects whether a party may immediately appeal a court’s ruling on state action 
immunity. This Comment argues that state action immunity only grants immunity 
from liability and thus is not immediately appealable, following the decision of 
the Ninth Circuit. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”), passed in 1890, was the first 
piece of legislation seeking to protect the United States economic market from 
monopolization and unfair competition.1 Following the statute’s enactment, the 
Federal Government was able to use its expanded regulatory powers under the 
Sherman Act to disrupt powerful private actor monopolies that employed anti-
competitive measures to control markets.2 Although the Sherman Act applies 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 103 (4th ed. 2017) (providing insight into the creation 
of the Sherman Act as a means to combat monopolies and rising prices); DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. 
ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICE INTRODUCTION 6 (3d ed. 2016) (identifying the 
Sherman Act as the first piece of antitrust legislation that paved the way for antitrust regulations in the 
United States); see also Sherman Antitrust Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/event/Sherman-Antitrust-Act [http://perma.cc/8PPE-Q3TU]. The Sherman Act gives rise to the 
subject of this Comment, state action immunity. See infra notes 3–113 and accompanying text. As 
such, the topic of this Comment is not substantively about the Sherman Act, but background 
knowledge of the Sherman Act is necessary to properly view and understand state action immunity. 
See infra notes 2–8 and accompanying text. 
 2 See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 188 (1911) (finding American Tobacco 
Co. violated the Sherman Act by controlling the tobacco market through monopolistic contracts in 
restraint of trade); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911) (finding that Standard Oil 
Co. violated the Sherman Act by consolidating stocks in an attempt to create a monopoly over the oil 
industry, resulting in unfair competition and restraint of trade). For an overview of antitrust history 
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to private actors, the text of the statute has been interpreted to exclude gov-
ernment actors, creating state action immunity.3 This Comment discusses the 
interpretation of state action immunity and the resultant United States circuit 
court split.4 With the Ninth Circuit’s decision in SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River 
Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, the circuits are split 
with three circuits finding that state action immunity grants immunity from 
liability, and two circuits concluding that it grants immunity from suit.5 An 
appeal to the United State Supreme Court to review the decision in SolarCity 
Corp. and resolve the discrepancy amongst the circuits was granted in Decem-
ber 2017.6 Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of the Sherman An-
titrust Act and state action immunity.7 Part II provides the legal history of state 
action immunity and examines the various interpretations of state action im-
munity that created a Circuit split regarding the ability to immediately appeal a 
state action immunity order.8 Finally, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit de-
cision in SolarCity Corp. was correct in interpreting state action immunity and 
the subsequent effect on appealing lower court decisions of immunity.9 
I. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT AND STATE ACTION IMMUNITY 
Originally enacted in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(“Sherman Act”) makes it illegal to contract or conspire in restraint of trade 
among the States.10 The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted 
                                                                                                                           
and policy in the United States, see Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust Goals, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 551 (2012) (providing an analysis of antitrust policy in the United States and the current frame-
work of antitrust law). 
 3 See Martin v. Mem’l Hosp., 86 F.3d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1996) (using “state action immunity” 
to refer to the government’s immunity to antitrust claims). State action immunity is a doctrine stating 
that the government is immune from antitrust claims. See id. Parker v. Brown was the first case in 
which the Supreme Court expressly recognized state action immunity, and as a result many scholars 
often refer to state action immunity as Parker immunity. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’r v. 
F.T.C., 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015) (referring to state action immunity as Parker immunity); Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS 
oF ANTITRUST LAW, § 2.04 (2003) (using Parker immunity to refer to state immunity to the Sherman 
Act). 
 4 See infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 5 859 F.3d 720, 726 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that state action immunity grants immunity from 
liability, joining the Fourth and Sixth Circuits); see infra notes 50–74 and accompanying text. 
 6 See Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted List of Cases for Argument in October 
Term 2017, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
17grantednotedlist.pdf [http://perma.cc/PFE2-H42Y] (listing SolarCity petition as granted).  
 7 See infra notes 10–50 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 51–94 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 95–113 and accompanying text. 
 10 See The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (making illegal monopolistic tactics and 
unfair competition between the States). Throughout this Comment, “State” capitalized refers to the 
State or States comprising the United States, whereas “state” is used to describe the governmental 
entity. 
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that the Sherman Act applies to private businesses and persons, but not to state 
governments or state actors.11 This inapplicability of the Sherman Act to state 
governments and actors has since been termed state action immunity.12 Alt-
hough it is well established that state actors have immunity from the Sherman 
Act, it is not immediately clear whether the immunity grants an immunity from 
lawsuits or an immunity from legal liability.13 The subsequent use of state ac-
                                                                                                                           
 11 See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224 (2013) (implying that the 
Sherman Act applies to private persons, and the Act is not intended to apply to state actors); Parker 
317 U.S. at 350 (finding that the Sherman Act may be violated if contraction or conspiracy occurs 
amongst private persons, but the Sherman Act does not apply to States acting as sovereigns); see also 
John P. Ludington, Valid Governmental Action as Conferring Immunity or Exemption from Private 
Liability Under Federal Antitrust Laws, 12 A.L.R. FED. 329 (2017) (stating that government action 
cannot be found to violate the Sherman Act). The Sherman Act does not include any direct language 
indicating a State is subject to antitrust regulations, and federal courts have expressly declined to ap-
ply the Sherman Act to state governments. See Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 568 U.S. at 224; Parker, 
317 U.S. at 350–51. Because the U.S. Congress has the authority to directly impose restrictions on 
state economies using the commerce power granted by the U.S. Constitution, courts are historically 
hesitant to interpret the Sherman Act as imposing a restriction without a further act from Congress. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Parker, 317 U.S. at 350 (stating that Congress could exercise author-
ity over a state’s economic power by asserting the federal government’s commerce power, but without 
a more explicit law, the Sherman Act does not apply to States); see also Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 
568 U.S. at 224. Moreover, courts have referred to the Senate Committee Report in considering the 
intended scope of the Sherman Act, which highlights that the intent of the Sherman Act is to restrict 
businesses and corporations. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (citing the congressional record as evidence 
that the Sherman Act only applies to businesses); 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890). 
 12 See Martin, 86 F.3d at 1394 (using state action immunity to describe the defendant’s claim of 
immunity from antitrust claims as a state actor). “State action immunity” has become a term-of-art 
with respect to antitrust claims, referring to the principle that state actors are immune from antitrust 
claims. See id. Although state action immunity as used herein refers specifically to immunity from 
antitrust claims, it is not to be confused with the state action doctrine. See infra notes 13–113 and 
accompanying text. In a simplified sense, the state action doctrine describes the principle that the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies to states, not private entities, however the 
Fourteenth Amendment may apply to a private actor when such actor acts on behalf of the state 
through sufficient entanglement or by providing a “public function” to such an extent that the private 
actor may be fairly deemed as acting as the State. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding state action where a coffee shop located in 
a building operated by public funds violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 
U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (finding state action because a privately owned town served a public function). 
For an extensive review of the state action doctrine, see G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of 
the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333 
(1997). 
 13 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 726 (interpreting state action immunity as immunity from 
liability); S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 445 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that state 
action immunity provides only immunity from liability); Huron Valley Hosp. Inc., v. City of Pontiac, 
792 F.2d 563, 567 (6th. Cir. 1986) (interpreting state action immunity to mean immunity from liabil-
ity). But see Martin, 86 F.3d at 1396 (finding that state action immunity provides immunity from suit); 
Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc., v. Hillsborough Cty. Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 
1986) (finding that state action immunity provides immunity from suit). Immunity from suit com-
pletely protects a party from the “burdens of trial” whereas immunity from liability only relieves the 
party from assuming liability for injuries caused. See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 726 (stating that 
immunity from liability in a Sherman Act claim limits the extent to which a party may be found liable 
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tion immunity has since caused a U.S. Circuit split.14 Section A of this Part 
introduces state action immunity and the circuit split that has resulted because 
of the differing interpretations of state action immunity.15 Section B discusses 
immunity from suit and the benefits it confers.16 Section C discusses immunity 
from liability and the difference between it and immunity from suit.17 Section 
D addresses the ability to immediately appeal a decision of state action im-
munity pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.18 
A. Interpreting State Action Immunity: A Circuit Split 
Although the general concept of state action immunity with respect to the 
Sherman Act is understood to provide some sort of immunity to a state or even 
a private actor via the state action doctrine, the specific type of immunity con-
ferred is the subject of a circuit split.19 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit courts 
have interpreted state action immunity to confer immunity from suit.20 In con-
trast, the Fourth, Sixth, and now Ninth Circuit courts have defined state action 
immunity to grant immunity from liability, meaning that although the party 
claiming immunity must go to trial, the party cannot be liable for any civil 
damages resulting from the antitrust claim.21 The primary difference between 
the types of immunity is that immunity from suit completely protects the party 
from trial, whereas immunity from liability requires the party to assert im-
munity as an affirmative defense and argue the case on the merits.22 Both types 
of immunity, however, may be raised as defenses at the outset of a trial and 
consequently, a judge may issue an interlocutory order affirming or denying 
immunity.23 The type of immunity asserted directly affects whether or not the 
                                                                                                                           
under the law); Huron, 792 F.2d at 566–67 (stating that immunity from suit relieves the party from the 
burdens of trial, but it is not a defense to liability). 
 14 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 37–50 and accompanying text. 
 19 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 20 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. Immunity from suit and immunity from liability 
are categorical terms used to describe a specific type of immunity. See Immunity to Suit or from Lia-
bility, 72 AM. JUR. 2d STATES, ETC. § 103 (2017) (using immunity from suit and immunity from 
liability as categories to describe sovereign immunity). For example, absolute immunity, qualified 
immunity, and sovereign immunity are all types of immunity from suit. See infra notes 26–32 and 
accompanying text. The differences between these immunities stems largely from the party asserting 
the immunity, which is further discussed in Part I section B. See infra notes 26–32 and accompanying 
text. 
 21 See infra notes 62–94 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 26–36 and accompanying text. 
 23 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an affirmative defense, such as immunity, 
may be asserted in a responsive pleading. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
also provides that certain defenses may be asserted prior to a responsive pleading, such as Rule 
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interlocutory order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, and that in 
turn depends on the circuit in which the case is heard.24 Consequently, it is im-
portant to understand the type of immunity granted by state action immunity in 
order to determine how a party may proceed at trial.25 
B. Immunity from Suit: You Can’t Touch Me 
Immunity from suit prevents a party from being sued, and it can take the 
form of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, or sovereign immunity.26 Im-
                                                                                                                           
12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which may reasonably include an 
assertion of immunity. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Black’s Law Dictionary defines interlocutory order as 
“an order that relates to some intermediate matter in the case; any order other than a final order.” In-
terlocutory Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). As such, a party may seek an inter-
locutory appeal to settle an intermediate matter relating to a case. See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 
723 (illustrating an appellant seeking an interlocutory appeal to settle the intermediate issue of the 
type of immunity conferred by state action immunity). 
 24 See id. at 726 (finding that state action immunity grants immunity from liability and therefore it 
cannot be immediately appealed); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 445 (finding that because state 
action immunity grants immunity from liability, orders concerning state action immunity may not be 
immediately appealed); Martin, 86 F.3d at 1396 (finding that state action immunity confers immunity 
from suit, so orders concerning state action immunity can be immediately appealed); Commuter 
Transp., 801 F.2d at 1287 (finding that state action immunity grants immunity from suit and therefore 
orders on state action immunity can be immediately appealed); Huron, 792 F.2d at 567 (interpreting 
state action immunity as an immunity from liability, and therefore orders on state action immunity 
may not be immediately appealed). The collateral order doctrine was first fully defined in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., where the Court described “that small class [of issues] which finally 
determine claims of right separable, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be 
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require appellate consideration be deferred 
until the whole case is adjudicated.” 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1948); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (stating that the collateral order doctrine provides a limited ex-
ception to the general rule that issues determined by lower courts are reviewable only after final 
judgment). Since its first use, the collateral order doctrine has been consistently applied in order to 
determine whether interlocutory orders of lower courts are immediately reviewable, i.e. ripe for an 
interlocutory appeal. See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 724 (using the collateral order doctrine to de-
termine whether immunity from liability may be immediately appealed); Commuter Transp., 801 F.3d 
at 1289 (applying the collateral order doctrine to determine whether the lower court decision of state 
action immunity is immediately appealable); Huron, 792 F.3d at 566 (using the collateral order doc-
trine in reviewing whether the order concerning of state action immunity in the lower court is immedi-
ately appealable); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 440 (using the collateral order doctrine to explain 
when an interlocutory order may be immediately appealed); Martin, 86 F.3d at 1396 (applying the 
collateral order doctrine to determine that because state action immunity confers immunity from suit, 
a lower court order concerning state action immunity is immediately appealable). 
 25 See supra note 13. 
 26 See supra note 20; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (finding that quali-
fied immunity grants the same immunity as absolute immunity, that is, immunity from suit). Sover-
eign immunity comes from the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which does 
not allow a citizen of one state to sue another State, thereby granting each State sovereign immunity 
i.e. immunity from suit. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890) 
(finding that States also cannot be sued by citizens of that State unless the State consents to suit, ex-
panding sovereign immunity). Although immunity from suit most often takes the form of absolute 
immunity, qualified immunity, or sovereign immunity, this is not an exhaustive list of the types of 
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munity from suit relieves the party from the “burdens of trial.”27 Absolute im-
munity is immunity from suit granted to high-ranking public officers by the 
Constitution or by courts as a matter of public policy.28 Qualified immunity is 
reserved for lower-level executive officials, such as governors, as a means to 
protect such officials in their use of discretionary power.29 The primary differ-
ence between absolute immunity and qualified immunity is that absolute im-
munity is assumed, whereas qualified immunity requires proof that the actor 
did not intend to violate a law and the actor acted reasonably under the circum-
stances.30 Similarly, sovereign immunity granted to the United States through 
the Eleventh Amendment generally provides states with immunity from suit.31 
Courts reason that immunity from suit is important not only to curb any poten-
tial disruption of the government, but also to protect the general public by pre-
venting needless waste of public resources.32 
                                                                                                                           
immunity from suit. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1977) (stating that the Fifth 
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees that an individual will not be tried twice for the same 
crime, effectively granting immunity from suit); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (finding that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause provides immunity from suit to the extent that an individual cannot be tried a 
second time for the same crime). 
 27 See supra note 13. 
 28 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744 (1982) (recognizing that immunity from suit is 
important as a matter of public policy to executive officials who may hesitate to exercise discretion 
without immunity from suit); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (stating that immunity from 
suit provides an important public function by allowing executive officials to make discretionary deci-
sions without fear of negative consequences). High-ranking officials who typically receive absolute 
immunity include the President of the United States and other executive officials. See Nixon, 457 U.S. 
at 744. In Nixon, the court noted that a president’s absolute immunity largely stems from the separa-
tion of powers that exists in the Constitution of the United States. See 457 U.S. at 752. Compare U.S. 
CONST. art. I (vesting specific powers to the legislative branch of federal government), with id. art. II 
(granting specific and separate powers to the executive branch of the federal government), and id. art. 
III (granting distinct powers to the judicial branch of the federal government). 
 29 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (finding that qualified immunity rather 
than absolute immunity is granted to executive officials such as governors, who require less protection 
than those who face more complex problems such as the President of the United States). 
 30 See id. at 815 (asserting that evidence must establish that the actor did not have a subjective 
intent to violate a law in order to assert qualified immunity). But see Nixon, 457 U.S. at 744–45 (im-
plying that absolute immunity is automatically conferred to certain officials such as the President of 
the United States as a matter of public policy). Absolute immunity is assumed because of the high-
level position of the actor. See id. (finding that the president may automatically invoke absolute im-
munity). 
 31 See supra note 26. 
 32 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (stating immunity from suit helps reduce the social costs of bur-
dening government and public expenditure for a costly litigation); Commuter Transp., 801 F.2d at 
1289 (finding that immunity from suit prevents the waste of public time and money). The Supreme 
Court, however, has noted that avoidance of trial alone is not the reason for granting immunity from 
suit, rather immunity from suit is granted to avoid trials that would cause a substantial impact on the 
public and greatly jeopardize the public interest. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 346 (2006) (stat-
ing that avoidance of trial alone is not sufficient justification for granting immunity from suit). 
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C. Immunity from Liability: You Still Can’t Touch Me 
In contrast, immunity from liability is most often created by statute and 
imposes limitations on liability, such as relieving a party from paying damag-
es.33 Most importantly, immunity from liability will not stop the proceedings 
of a trial.34 Rather, although a party may not be liable for civil damages, the 
party must still go to trial on the merits and subsequently assert immunity as an 
affirmative defense.35 Because immunity from liability and immunity from suit 
confer different protections, the ability to appeal an interlocutory order on im-
munity differs based on the requirements of the collateral order doctrine.36 
D. State Action Immunity and the Collateral Order Doctrine 
Generally, interlocutory orders are not appealable until a final judgment 
on the merits of a case has been entered.37 United States appellate courts, how-
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 711 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(stating that immunity from liability is not immunity from trial). Immunity from liability is often cre-
ated by statute, for example Hawaii’s “Good Samaritan” statute, which creates a statutory exception to 
liability. HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.5 (2009). As an illustration of immunity from liability, the Good 
Samaritan statute provides protection from civil damages to individuals who provide emergency care 
in good faith to a person in need of such aid in the event the individual giving aid makes a mistake 
causing injury to the person in need. Id. Although the individual rendering aid will have to stand trial, 
the statute provides immunity from liability, allowing the defendant to assert immunity as an affirma-
tive defense and thus be immune from civil damages. Id. 
 34 See Nunag-Tanedo, 711 F.3d at 1140 (finding that immunity from liability does not stop a 
trial). Although immunity from liability does not stop trial proceedings, immunity from liability is still 
a powerful defense that can grant significant protection by relieving the party of any civil damages 
that may result from the trial. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 517 (stating that qualified immunity prevents a 
party from paying civil damages); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (finding that qualified immunity protects a 
party from paying civil damages).  
 35 See Nunag-Tanedo, 711 F.3d at 1140 (finding that although immunity from liability does not 
stop a trial, it may protect a party from liability). An assertion of immunity such as state action im-
munity is usually accompanied by a motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), which if granted would end the trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); SolarCity, 859 F.3d at 
726 (stating that an assertion of state action immunity as a means to dismiss a case is no different from 
other 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss). Thus an assertion of immunity from liability can quickly end a 
trial if the court rules in favor of the motion to dismiss. See SolarCity, 859 F.3d at 726 (stating that if 
the court cannot reasonably find liability, then a motion to dismiss based on immunity should be 
granted). Although the benefits of immunity from suit and immunity from liability thus seem very 
similar, the Supreme Court has stated the crucial difference is immunity from suit is a right not to be 
tried, whereas immunity from liability is a right that allows charges to be dismissed. See United States 
v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., Inc., 458 U.S. 263, 269 (1982) (finding that the right conferred by im-
munity from suit is expressly distinct from the right conferred by immunity from liability).  
 36 See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 37 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (stating that appellate courts have jurisdiction over final decisions made 
by district courts). Interlocutory orders are reviewable on appeal from district courts in accordance 
with standard appeal practice as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See id. (stating that final decisions of 
district courts are appealable); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23 (defining interlocutory 
order). 
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ever, have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals under the collateral order 
doctrine, which stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 1292.38 In order 
to immediately appeal, the collateral order doctrine requires that an interlocu-
tory (1) be conclusive, (2) address a question that is separate from the merits of 
the underlying case, and (3) raise an issue of particular value that evades effec-
tive review if not considered immediately.39 Given the rigor of the test, it is no 
surprise that only a limited number of questions are appealable under the doc-
trine.40 Moreover in recent years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the collat-
eral order doctrine very narrowly, finding that an immediate appeal is appro-
priate only when rights would be “irretrievably lost” without such an appeal.41 
Thus, only a small number of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable 
prior to a final judgment on the merits.42  
Courts have held that immunity from suit is immediately appealable, but 
immunity from liability is not.43 The collateral order doctrine allows an imme-
diate appeal of immunity from suit because a district court order granting im-
munity from suit conclusively determines the case outcome, presents a ques-
tion separate from the merits of the case, and cannot be effectively reviewed 
following a final judgment of the case.44 Immunity from suit cannot be proper-
                                                                                                                           
 38 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1292. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 grants appellate courts jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from lower courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 grants courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear appeals of interlocu-
tory orders made by district courts. 
 39 See supra note 24. 
 40 See supra note 38. 
 41 See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985) (finding that the collateral 
order doctrine allows for an immediate appeal only when rights would be denied without an immedi-
ate appeal); Risjord, 449 U.S. at 374 (stating that there is a limited class of claims which may be im-
mediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine). See generally Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing 
Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007) (providing an extensive overview of the collat-
eral order doctrine including the statutory history of the doctrine as well as its limits and implications 
for interlocutory orders). 
 42 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Commuter Transp., 801 F.3d at 1289 (finding that immunity from suit is immediately ap-
pealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine); Martin, 86 F.3d at 1395 (finding that an interlocu-
tory order denying qualified immunity, which confers immunity from suit, is immediately appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine); see also SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 724 (stating that immunity 
from liability is not immediately appealable). But see Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 444 (implying 
that immunity from liability cannot be immediately appealed pursuant to the collateral order doctrine); 
Huron, 792 F.2d at 567 (finding that immunity from liability is not immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine, unlike immunity from suit). Although both immunity from suit and immuni-
ty from liability will ultimately render a party not liable for any civil damages, immunity from suit 
provides an additional advantage because the party need not shoulder the burdens of trial. See Huron, 
792 F.2d at 566–67 (recognizing that immunity from suit relieves a party from the burdens of trial, 
which affords a stronger protection than immunity from liability); SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 728 
(stating that one reason for granting immunity from suit is to protect a party from the burdens of trial). 
 44 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 512 (reasoning that interlocutory orders of immunity from suit are 
immediately appealable because immunity from suit is conclusive in a trial); Board of Dentistry, 455 
F.3d at 440 (stating that orders of immunity from suit must be immediately appealable in order to 
conserve the right afforded); see also SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 724; Huron, 792 F.3d at 566. 
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ly reviewed following final judgment because the immunity relieves the party 
from the burdens of trial, so if the party must wait until trial is over to appeal, 
the party is effectively denied the right conferred.45 
In contrast, immunity from liability is not immediately appealable under 
the collateral order doctrine.46 A judgment on immunity from liability is con-
clusive and separate from the merits of the case, however the third requirement 
is not satisfied: immunity from liability is effectively reviewable on appeal 
from final judgment.47 Immunity from liability does not prevent a party from 
going to trial on the merits; it only acts as an affirmative defense removing 
liability for the party asserting immunity.48 As such, no rights are denied by 
waiting to appeal from a final judgment.49 Because of these differences, inter-
locutory orders on immunity from suit are immediately appealable; however, 
orders on immunity from liability are not.50 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION  
OF STATE ACTION IMMUNITY 
Given that immunity from suit can be immediately appealed but immuni-
ty from liability cannot, a court’s interpretation of state action immunity as 
either immunity from suit or liability directly affects the rights of a party.51 As 
federal courts have faced the question of interpreting state action immunity, a 
circuit split has developed between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts, 
which interpreted state action immunity as immunity from suit, and the Fourth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, which interpreted it as immunity from liability.52 
A. State Action Immunity as Immunity from Suit:  
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
In 1986, in Commuter Transport Systems, Inc., v. Hillsborough County 
Aviation Authority, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
held that state action immunity is substantially similar to qualified immunity, 
and therefore grants immunity from suit.53 The court reasoned that state action 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See supra notes 33, 39. 
 46 See supra note 42.  
 47 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 725 (reasoning that interlocutory orders on immunity from 
liability are not immediately appealable because such orders are effectively reviewed after final judg-
ment); Huron, 792 F.3d at 568 (finding that immunity from liability can be effectively reviewed after 
final judgment). 
 48 See supra notes 33–34. 
 49 See supra notes 33–34. 
 50 See supra note 13, 34–39. 
 51 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 53–95 and accompanying text. 
 53 See 801 F.2d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that state action immunity confers im-
munity from suit). 
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immunity is intended to protect officials exercising discretionary power who 
otherwise might hesitate to exercise that power for fear of litigation.54 For ex-
ample, in Hillsborough, the Florida legislature created the Aviation Authority 
for Hillsborough County (the “Authority”), which was permitted to regulate 
traffic at the county airport.55 In the interest of reducing traffic, the Authority 
granted a monopoly for passenger pickup permits to certain limousine compa-
nies by excluding others.56 In the suit claiming the Authority violated the 
Sherman Act, the court concluded that state action immunity must grant im-
munity from suit.57 The court reasoned that without such a strong protection, 
the Authority would second-guess its decision to grant a monopoly and hesitate 
to take action it deemed necessary out of fear of litigation, paralleling the rea-
soning of qualified immunity.58 
Similarly, in Martin v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that state action immunity grants 
immunity from suit.59 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that state action 
immunity allows officials to use discretionary power without fear of litigation, 
protects officials carrying out governmental duties, and encourages individuals 
to run for public office by reducing potential liability for their actions.60 The 
court further implied that state action immunity must confer immunity from 
suit because the alternative, immunity from liability, will not sufficiently pro-
tect officials from the burdens of trial.61 Consequently, because state action 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. at 1289. 
 55 Id. at 1288. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1290. 
 58 See id. at 1287–88. One of the rationales for granting qualified immunity is that executive offi-
cials such as governors would hesitate to exercise their discretionary decision-making power because 
of fear of costly litigation as well as the waste of public resources. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 807 (1982). In Commuter Transp., the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the underlying 
purpose of qualified immunity is the same as state action immunity, both must confer the same type of 
immunity, that is absolute immunity. See 801 F.2d at 1289–90. 
 59 See 86 F.3d 1391, 1396–97 (5th Cir. 1996). In Martin, a state subdivision municipal hospital 
granted a contract to a specific doctor, allowing that doctor to treat and manage all patients with end 
stage renal disease. See id. at 1393. Plaintiff sued the hospital, claiming the hospital engaged in anti-
competitive conduct in violation of the Sherman Act. See id. In response, the hospital claimed state 
action immunity, which was denied by the trial court. See id. The Fifth Circuit reversed in part, find-
ing that the hospital had a right to claim state action immunity to the Sherman Act. Id. at 1400. 
 60 Id. at 1396. 
 61 See id. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the intended purpose of state action immunity is to pro-
tect officials from the burdens of trial, so state action immunity must confer immunity from suit. See 
id. The Fifth Circuit further relied on the reasoning in Parker v. Brown finding that the Sherman Act 
was not intended to obstruct or hinder a State’s ability to regulate its economy, and therefore the 
stronger protection of immunity from suit is the appropriate interpretation of state action immunity. 
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (finding that the Sherman Act does not apply to 
states); Martin, 86 F.3d at 1395 (stating that because Parker concluded that states are in no way re-
strained by the Sherman Act, state action immunity must grant immunity from suit). 
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immunity is interpreted to confer immunity from suit, both the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits allow interlocutory appeals on the matter.62 
B. State Action Immunity as Immunity from Liability:  
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
In contrast, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have interpreted state action 
immunity to confer immunity from liability.63 In South Carolina State Board of 
Dentistry v. FTC., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that state ac-
tion immunity to the Sherman Act grants immunity from liability, not a “right 
not to be tried.”64 The court highlighted three distinct reasons why state action 
immunity is different from other immunities from suit, namely qualified im-
munity, absolute immunity, and sovereign immunity.65 First, municipalities 
may assert state action immunity, but they may not assert qualified immunity 
because suits against municipalities do not impact state officials, one of the 
major policy reasons behind qualified immunity.66 Because municipalities may 
invoke state action immunity but not qualified immunity, the protection afford-
ed by each must be distinct.67 Second, state action immunity provides immuni-
ty from all antitrust claims, regardless of the type of relief sought.68 In contrast, 
qualified immunity does not prevent lawsuits seeking injunctions or other eq-
uitable relief.69 Third, state action immunity can be invoked in lawsuits 
brought by the federal government, yet sovereign immunity cannot.70 For the 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 63 See 455 F.3d 436, 445 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that state action immunity grants immunity from 
liability); Huron Valley Hosp. Inc., v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.2d 563, 566 (6th. Cir. 1986) (holding that 
state action immunity grants immunity from liability). 
 64 Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 445. 
 65 See id. at 446–47. 
 66 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (finding that municipalities may 
not assert qualified immunity). Municipalities, commonly referred to as cities or towns, are local ad-
ministrative units of a State, whose powers are granted by a State and consequently are subordinate to 
the State. Municipality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Because a lawsuit against a 
municipality is not a lawsuit against the State, State-level officials are not involved in the suit nor is a 
State itself a party to the suit. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 638; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (reasoning 
that qualified immunity, and consequently immunity from suit, protects States and state officials from 
the burdens of trial); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 446. 
 67 See Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 445. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Id.; see also Am. Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc., v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (stating that qualified immunity does not prevent suits seeking declaratory or equitable 
relief); Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1331 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity does not prevent suits for declaratory or injunctive relief). 
 70 See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140–41 (finding no constitutional limit prevent-
ing the federal government from suing a state, particularly because doing so would diminish the pow-
er of the courts to protect citizens against abusive and discriminatory state actions). The fact that a 
State may assert state action immunity in a lawsuit brought by the federal government provides reason 
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foregoing reasons, the Fourth Circuit held that state action immunity is distinct 
from the various types of immunity from suit, and thus state action immunity 
can only provide immunity from liability.71 The Fourth Circuit therefore does 
not allow interlocutory appeals on state action immunity judgments.72 
Similarly, in Huron Valley Hospital, Inc., v. City of Pontiac, the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reasoned that state action immunity grants an exemption 
to liability, rather than an exemption from suit.73 Although the court did not 
explicitly define state action immunity as immunity from liability, the court 
implied that state action immunity cannot be used to avoid trial, but it may be 
used to escape liability.74 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit also does not allow 
interlocutory appeals on state action immunity.75 
C. Tipping the Scale: The Ninth Circuit Joins the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
Following the reasoning of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that state action immunity confers immunity from liability.76 In 
2015, SolarCity Corporation filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Arizona against Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement 
and Power District (“SRP”) alleging that SRP used monopolistic tactics in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act.77 SolarCity, the United States’ largest seller and in-
staller of solar panels, claimed that SRP, a public water and power utility or-
ganization, intentionally charged consumers who installed solar panels in-
creased rates in order to discourage the installation of solar panels.78 SRP 
moved to dismiss, claiming SRP is absolutely immune from antitrust suits in 
                                                                                                                           
to conclude that state action immunity is different from sovereign immunity. See Board of Dentistry, 
455 F.3d at 446. 
 71 See Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 446–47. 
 72 See id. at 447. 
 73 See 792 F.2d at 567. In Huron, Huron Valley, a Michigan nonprofit corporation, sought ap-
proval from the state, city, and federal officials (the Defendants) to build a hospital. See id. at 565 The 
request was subsequently denied, and Huron Valley then sued the Defendants claiming violation of 
the Sherman Act by engaging in conspiracy in restraint of trade by blocking construction of the hospi-
tal. See id. at 565–66. 
 74 See id. at 567. Because immunity from suit grants a right to avoid trial, the court implied that 
state action immunity can only confer immunity from liability. See id. 
 75 See id. Because the court concluded that state action immunity confers immunity from liability, 
a lower court decision denying state action immunity is effectively reviewable after a final judgment. 
See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. Consequently, the decision is not subject to the collat-
eral order doctrine, and no interlocutory appeal will be granted. See supra notes 40–44, 65–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 76 See SolarCity Corp., v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 859 F.3d 720, 
730 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 77 See generally SolarCity Corp., v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., NO. 
CV-25-00374-PHX-DLR, 2015 WL 6503439 (D. Ariz. 2015). 
 78 See id. at 1. SRP is a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, formed under Arizona stat-
ute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 2 § 48-2302 (2017). 
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accordance with state action immunity.79 The district court denied SRP’s mo-
tion to dismiss, stating that whether SRP qualified for state action immunity is 
a factual matter and thus not appropriate for a 12(b)(6) motion.80 SRP appealed 
to the Ninth Circuit and argued that if SRP is in fact immune from suit because 
of state action immunity, the district court’s decision is not effectively review-
able after a final decision on the merits of the case, and therefore the interlocu-
tory appeal is appropriate.81 The Ninth Circuit rejected SRP’s argument hold-
ing that state action immunity grants immunity from liability.82  
Concluding that state action immunity confers immunity from liability, 
the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Par-
ker.83 In Parker, the Supreme Court asserted that the Sherman Act was not in-
tended to place any limit on a State’s ability to control its economy, but Con-
gress could impose such a limit.84 Because Congress can restrict  a State’s abil-
ity to regulate antitrust matters, States must also be subject to lawsuits if a re-
striction is violated, and therefore state action immunity can only grant im-
munity from liability.85 Following the decision that state action immunity 
grants immunity from liability, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the collateral 
order doctrine did not apply, and thus the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal.86 
The Ninth Circuit also expressly distinguished state action immunity from 
qualified immunity, absolute immunity, and sovereign immunity, further sup-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); SolarCity Corp., NO. CV-25-00374-PHX-DLR, 2015 WL 
6503429 at *13. A 12(b)(6) motion seeks to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6). In order to survive the motion, the opposing party, usually plaintiff, must show that their 
pleading identifies a legal theory upon which a court can grant relief. See Motion for Dismissal for 
Failure to State a Claim, Generally, 27A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 62:455 (2017). 
 81 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 724. Immunity from suit is not effectively reviewable after a 
final decision because the party seeking immunity would have to shoulder the burdens of trial, thus 
denying the right conferred by immunity from suit. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 82 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 730. 
 83 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51 (finding that the Sherman Act does not restrict state legisla-
tures, but Congress may pass legislation that does restrict state legislatures); SolarCity Corp., 859 
F.3d at 726 (relying on Parker to reason that the Sherman Act does not grant immunity from suit 
because Congress may restrict a state legislature thus preserving the possibility of a lawsuit). 
 84 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350 (stating that the Congress could impose antitrust regulations on a 
State). If Congress could not impose restrictions on a state, then the Ninth Circuit plausibly would 
have concluded that state action immunity grants immunity from suit. See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d 
at 726. Because Congress in theory can impose antitrust regulations on States, States cannot be com-
pletely immune to antitrust claims as compared to sovereign immunity, which does provide immunity 
from suit. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 726. The idea that there is a pre-
served right to sue suggests that if Congress decided to enact legislation holding states liable for anti-
trust violations, such legislation would overrule the state action immunity exception. See Parker, 317 
U.S. at 351 (noting that Congress may impose limits on states in accordance with Constitution). 
 86 SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 726; see supra note 64. 
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porting its interpretation as immunity from liability.87 While qualified immuni-
ty is granted to government officials in part to reduce potential distraction of 
public officers and decrease the amount of wasted public resources, a govern-
ment official must also show that they acted reasonably under the circumstanc-
es  in order to properly assert qualified immunity.88 Consequently, SRP’s con-
tention that denying immediate appellate review of state action immunity will 
waste resources by dragging out litigation was not sufficient to equate state 
action immunity to qualified immunity.89 The Ninth Circuit thus found that 
state action immunity is distinct from qualified immunity.90  
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to adopt the arguments 
of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, holding that state action immunity confers 
immunity from suit.91 Rather, the Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s nar-
rowing interpretation of the collateral order doctrine to support its conclusion 
that state action immunity grants immunity from liability.92 Because the collat-
eral order doctrine has been interpreted so narrowly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that any given claim will most probably not be immediately appealable under 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See id. at 729 (analyzing the differences between state action immunity and types of immunity 
from suit). In its analysis, the court compares and contrasts state action immunity to the various types 
of immunity form suit in order to draw inferences as to whether state action immunity confers immun-
ity form suit or immunity from liability. See id. at 728–30 (identifying the differences between state 
action immunity from absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and sovereign immunity). The court 
ultimately concluded that there are numerous differences between state action immunity and the types 
of immunity from suit, thus reasoning that state action immunity must grant immunity from liability. 
See id. 
 88 See id., 859 F.3d at 728 (asserting that government distraction and inconvenience alone does 
not invoke the collateral order doctrine, and thus it cannot be the sole grounds for an interlocutory 
appeal); supra note 33 and accompanying text. The court reasons that if qualified immunity were 
granted solely as a means for a government official to get out of a trial, then § 1291 reserving appeals 
to issues of final decisions would be rendered useless as government officials would always be able to 
immediately appeal any issue in which they are involved. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); Will v. Hal-
lock, 546 U.S. 345, 346 (2006) (finding that § 1291 would be rendered obsolete in any case involving 
a government official if qualified immunity allowed immediate appeal solely for the reason of avoid-
ing trial); SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 728 (echoing the reasoning that qualified immunity allows an 
immediate appeal for reasons beyond simply avoiding trial). 
 89 See supra note 88. 
 90 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 728 (stating that an assertion of qualified immunity requires a 
showing that the official asserting immunity acted reasonably under the circumstances, not just that 
the trial distracts the government). 
 91 See id. at 730. 
 92 See id. The Supreme Court has consistently concluded that the collateral order doctrine pro-
vides a narrow exception to appealing issues because a broad interpretation would result in multiple 
appeals and would do away with the force of § 1291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Mohawk Indus. v. Car-
penter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (stating that the collateral order doctrine must reflect the values of 
the final-judgment rule in limiting the ability to appeal issues prior to final judgment); Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981) (emphasizing that the collateral order doctrine is 
only available for a limited class of claims); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
546 (1948) (finding that the collateral order doctrine only applies to a small class of claims, which 
must be immediately appealed in order to be effectively reviewed). 
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the collateral order doctrine.93 Therefore, interpreting state action immunity as 
immunity from liability was consistent with the narrow scope of the collateral 
order doctrine.94 
III. ANALYSIS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOLARCITY CORP. 
Given the current law surrounding state action immunity and the collat-
eral order doctrine, the Ninth Circuit was correct in concluding that state action 
immunity grants immunity from liability, joining the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits.95 Although the Sherman Act does provide for state action immunity to 
antitrust claims, it is clear that Congress could institute regulations blocking a 
State’s decision to regulate its economy.96 Because Congress can impose limits 
on states in this manner, it follows that states can never be absolutely immune 
from antitrust claims, whether a current statute such as the Sherman Act exists 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 730 (implying that the Supreme Court’s consistently narrow 
interpretation of the collateral order doctrine bolsters a finding that state action immunity grants im-
munity from liability and therefore is not immediately appealable). 
 94 See id. 
 95 See SolarCity Corp., v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 859 F.3d 720, 
730 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that state action immunity confers immunity from liability and cannot be 
immediately appealed pursuant to the collateral order doctrine); see also S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. 
FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 445 (4th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that state action immunity provides immunity from 
liability); Huron Valley Hosp. Inc., v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.2d 563, 567 (6th. Cir. 1986) (finding that 
state action immunity confers immunity from liability, not immunity from suit). 
 96 See The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (creating state action immunity by not 
implicating states in the law); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224 (2013) 
(clarifying that the Sherman Act does not apply to state regulatory actions where the action is clearly 
made on behalf of the state); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (interpreting the Sherman 
Act to apply to states exercising its regulatory powers given the history and text of the statute, ex-
pressly recognizing state action immunity); 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890) (explaining that the purpose 
of the Sherman Act is to prohibit businesses and corporations from engaging in anticompetitive con-
tracts and unfair competition). Congress may regulate a state’s economy by exercising its commerce 
power, granted by Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Whereas 
the Commerce Clause only grants power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, it is reasonable 
to conclude that a state-created monopoly would fall under this prescription because of the relatively 
broad interpretation of interstate commerce. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 
(1980) (finding that a claim against a private corporation based upon the Sherman Act need only show 
that the alleged violation affects interstate commerce); Parker, 317 U.S. at 350 (concluding, but not 
deciding, that the federal government could regulate a state monopoly under the commerce clause); 
John J. Dvorske et al., State Regulation of Intrastate Commerce, 12B TEX. JUR. 3d CONST. LAW, 
§ 116 (2017) (stating that Congress may pass regulations restricting intrastate commerce where the 
regulation is necessary to protect interstate commerce); see also CHARLES R. GEISST, MONOPOLIES IN 
AMERICA: EMPIRE BUILDERS AND THEIR ENEMIES FROM JAY GOULD TO BILL GATES 44 (2000) (im-
plying that monopolies affect interstate commerce by making it difficult for any competitor to enter a 
market controlled by a monopoly); M.A. UTTON, MARKET DOMINANCE AND ANTITRUST POLICY 9 
(2d ed. 2003) (finding that monopolies necessarily lockout external competitors). 
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or not.97 Thus, any immunity afforded by a statute with respect to antitrust 
claims can only plausibly provide immunity from liability.98 
Moreover, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits are persuasive in identifying the 
differences between state action immunity and immunities from suit.99 For ex-
ample, municipalities may assert state action immunity but may not claim 
qualified immunity.100 Other differences include that fact that state action im-
munity provides immunity from all antitrust claims and not just claims seeking 
equitable relief, and state action immunity may be invoked in lawsuits brought 
by the federal government.101 The identified distinctions illustrate important 
differences between types of immunity from suit and state action immunity, 
suggesting that state action immunity is separate and distinct from immunity 
from suit.102 
Following the interpretation of state action immunity as immunity from 
liability, the collateral order doctrine should not apply to interlocutory orders 
on state action immunity.103 The collateral order doctrine only grants jurisdic-
tion for immediate appeals when the interlocutory order is conclusive, the or-
der addresses a question that is separate from the merits of the underlying case, 
and the order evades effective review if not considered immediately.104 Im-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 98 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 99 See Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 445 (finding that state action immunity provides immunity 
from liability); Huron, 792 F.2d at 567 (concluding that state action immunity confers immunity from 
liability, not immunity from suit). 
 100 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (finding that municipalities may 
not assert qualified immunity). Recall that qualified immunity confers immunity from suit, therefore if 
state action immunity can be invoked but qualified immunity cannot, then that suggests a significant 
difference between the two types of immunity. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
 101 See Am. Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc., v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 
1991) (finding that qualified immunity does not provide immunity in suits seeking declaratory or 
equitable relief); Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1331 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity does not prevent suits for declaratory or injunctive relief). Recall that both 
qualified immunity and sovereign immunity grant immunity from suit. See supra notes 27–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 102 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 729 (identifying differences between state action immunity 
and types of immunities from suit); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 446–47 (reasoning that state ac-
tion immunity does not confer immunity from suit because of the numerous differences between state 
action immunity and types of immunity from suit). If state action immunity does not provide immuni-
ty from suit, then it must provide immunity from liability. See supra notes 66–69, 88 and accompany-
ing text. 
 103 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 730 (finding that state action immunity cannot be immediate-
ly appealed); DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that 
immunity from liability is different in kind from immunity from suit, and consequently immunity 
from liability is not subject to the collateral order doctrine); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 447 (find-
ing that the collateral order doctrine cannot be applied to state action immunity); Huron, 792 F.2d at 
568 (reasoning that because state action immunity confers immunity from liability, it cannot be im-
mediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine). 
 104 See supra note 13. 
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munity from liability can be effectively reviewed following final judgment on 
the merits and as such, no rights are denied if not reviewed immediately.105 
The collateral order doctrine thus does not grant an appellate court jurisdiction 
over an interlocutory order concerning state action immunity as was decided 
by the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.106 
As a consequence of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of state action im-
munity as immunity from liability, there is a shift in the circuit split with three 
circuits holding that state action immunity grants immunity from liability and 
two circuits holding that it grants immunity from suit.107 Because of the circuit 
split, there is currently unequal treatment under the law with respect to state 
action immunity.108 Although a state actor invoking state action immunity will 
ultimately not be liable for civil damages, immunity from suit granted in the 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See supra note 13. 
 106 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 730 (finding that state action immunity cannot be immediate-
ly appealed under collateral order doctrine); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 447 (finding that the 
appellate court does not have jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal concerning state action im-
munity in accordance with the collateral order doctrine); Huron, 792 F.2d at 568 (finding that the 
appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal concerning state action immuni-
ty). 
 107 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 726 (interpreting state action immunity as immunity from 
liability); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 445 (finding that state action immunity provides only im-
munity from liability); Huron, 792 F.2d at 567 (interpreting state action immunity to mean immunity 
from liability). But see Martin v. Mem’l Hosp., 86 F.3d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that state 
action immunity provides immunity from suit); Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc., v. Hillsborough Cty. 
Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that state action immunity provides 
immunity from suit). 
 108 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 726 (finding that state action immunity may not be immedi-
ately appealed under the collateral order doctrine); Board of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 445 (concluding 
that state action immunity cannot be appealed prior to final judgment); Huron, 792 F.2d at 567 (find-
ing that orders denying state action immunity do not meet the requirements of the collateral order 
doctrine). But see Martin, 86 F.3d at 1397 (finding that state action immunity orders satisfy the re-
quirements of the collateral order doctrine); Commuter Transp., 801 F.2d at 1287 (finding that orders 
denying state action immunity can be immediately appealed prior to final judgment). The direct con-
sequence of the circuit split is that the benefits afforded to actors asserting state action immunity are 
different, granting either immunity from liability or immunity from suit. See supra note 13 and ac-
companying text. The impact of this difference not only affects the type of immunity conferred, but 
also whether the party may file an interlocutory appeal. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying 
text. Note also that the Ninth Circuit in SolarCity Corp. noted in footnote six that the Tenth Circuit 
and Seventh Circuit have cited the opinions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit, but neither circuit has 
affirmatively ruled on the state action immunity issue, leaving open the possibility of a further Circuit 
split. See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 729 n.6 (citing Tenth and Seventh Circuit cases that allude to 
the question of appealing a state action immunity order); Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, LLC 
v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, 703 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging the circuit 
split concerning state action immunity, but not reaching a conclusion on the issue as it was found to be 
outside the scope of the case before the court); Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F.2d 344, 
346 (1987) (citing the Fifth Circuit decision in Commuter Transp. but not addressing the question of 
state action immunity as it is outside the scope of the case before the court); Commuter Transp., 801 
F.2d at 1287. 
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Fifth and Eleventh Circuits provides a significantly stronger protection than 
immunity from liability granted by the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.109 
The presence of the Circuit split particularly impacts state actors seeking 
to enforce regulations over State economies because the jurisdiction in which 
the state actor operates will determine whether federal law grants the actor 
immunity from suit or immunity from liability.110 State actors are thus being 
treated differently under federal law solely on the basis of the appellate Circuit 
in which the state actor operates.111 This is particularly worrisome as many 
States are beginning to restrict certain services as technology advances, such as 
restricting Uber’s ability to pick-up passengers at an airport, thereby granting a 
de facto monopoly to taxi cabs.112 Given the Ninth Circuit’s decision joining 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits and the persuasive reasoning provided therein, 
other jurisdictions should follow the Ninth Circuit and hold that state action 
immunity confers immunity from liability and thus is not subject to an inter-
locutory appeal.113 
CONCLUSION 
State action immunity to antitrust claims is an important protection for 
state actors, granting states the freedom to regulate state economies. Although 
state actors are provided immunity from antitrust claims, the immunity con-
ferred is currently the subject of a circuit split, creating unequal protection un-
der federal law. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted state action 
immunity to grant immunity from suit, relieving the state actor from the bur-
dens of trial as well as allowing an immediate appeal of a district court deci-
sion of immunity under the collateral order doctrine. In contrast, the Fourth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have interpreted state action immunity to grant im-
munity from liability by highlighting the numerous differences between state 
action immunity and types of immunities from suit. Given these differences, 
state action immunity can only plausibly confer immunity from liability. Con-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 110 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 111 See supra note 107. This issue is particularly important for states seeking to exercise their 
authority to regulate their state economy. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (noting that 
under the Constitution, state governments are meant to have the power to regulate ordinary affairs and 
internal state matters). If state actors, especially in the circuits that have yet to weigh in on the issue, 
do not know whether they will be granted immunity from suit or immunity from liability, the state 
actors may be more likely to hesitate in exercising their power to regulate their economy. See supra 
notes 13, 107. 
112 See Kerry Close, Why You Can’t Take an Uber Home from the Airport, TIME, Feb. 1, 2018, 
http://time.com/money/4396248/uber-lyft-ban-airport/[ http://perma.cc/9A35-8N8A]. Moreover, as 
States seek to enforce such regulations, State actors will not know how a litigation alleging a Sherman 
Act violation will proceed unless the State is in a jurisdiction that has weighed in on the Circuit Split. 
See supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 113 See SolarCity Corp., 859 F.3d at 726; supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
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sequently, state action immunity does not fall within the purview of the collat-
eral order doctrine meaning that interlocutory orders on state action immunity 
cannot be appealed until after final judgment. Until the Supreme Court holds 
otherwise, other circuits should follow the Ninth Circuit’s persuasive reasoning 
and conclude that state action immunity confers immunity from liability and 
thus cannot be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine. 
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